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Preface
In 1984, at the request of the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA), the Aeronautics and Space Engineering Board
(ASEB) undertook a study of NASA's space station program. The results
of this study by the ASEB's ad hoc Committee on Space Station
Engineering and Technology Development were published in February
1985. NASA found the study useful and asked the ASEB to continue
examination of the evolving space station program through a series of
more specific studies on:
maintainability,
research and technology in space,
solar thermodynamics research and technology,
program performance,
onboard command and control, and
research and technology road maps.
The subjects of maintainability, research and technology in space,
and solar thermodynamics research and technology have already been the
subjects of committee roundtable and workshop panel meetings. The
subjects of space station program performance and onboard mission
control, addressed in a roundtable forum by another committee panel
are reported here in the form of meeting proceedings. It was the
intent of this meeting to provide NASA with an insight into non-NASA
experience that has the potential for improving space station system
program performance from cost and mission operations considerations.
The panel consisted of selected members of the ASEB ad hoc space
station committee and representatives from industry with special
knowledge and experience in the areas of program performance and
mission command and control. In the roundtable, individual panel
members discussed their views on these matters and NASA representatives
presented summaries of related space station program activity. The
panel, in light of discussions with NASA representatives and further
deliberations within the panel, developed summary statements of
findings.
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These proceedings contain synopses of the panel's discussion and
NASA's presentations as well as the panel's observations for further
consideration by NASA's space station program management. Several
matters are addressed in these proceedings that warrant specific
consideration by space station program management:
• Focusing on improving cost estimates to allow identification of
cost drivers and to assist in program descoping, if descoping is
required.
• Developing top-level directives that explicitly identify program
philosophy, technical guidelines, and performance and cost
constraints to provide a firm base for program definition,
development, and support activity.
• Reviewing management lines of authority, responsibility, and
staffing to assure single lines of direction and action; adequate
staffing of critical functions, i.e., system operations; and best
use of staff, i.e., interface management.
• Reserving bridge-type command and control operation for the space
station and routine, daily, and long-term planning and operations
support for the ground to allow appropriate use of the space crew.
• Making the program and contractor management fully aware of and
sensitive to the matters of cost reduction and cost and schedule
control to help hold program technical and cost factors within
commitments.
JOSEPH F. SHEA
Chairman, Panel on Program Performance
and Onboard Mission Control
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The panel appreciates the time, effort, and candor of the NASA
representatives who provided information and engaged in open
discussion during deliberations.
As with the other technical subjects reviewed in this series of
roundtables and workshops on the evolving space station program, the
panel recognizes that the program is in the concept development
stage. Within a matter of not too many months, program management
will have to firm up specifications and guidelines for the start of
preliminary design. It is in this context that the panel makes its
observations with a view to assisting NASA in accomplishing its
difficult task.
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Introduction
BACKGROUND
In 1984 the ad hoc Committee on Space Station Engineering and
Technology Development of the Aeronautics and Space Engineering Board
(ASEB) conducted a review of the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration's (NASA's) space station program planning. The review
addressed the initial operating configuration (IOC) of the station.
The committee's study was released in February 1985. NASA factored
the results of the study into its Phase B (concept and preliminary
design) request for proposals issued to industry in September 1984 and
awarded in April 1985.
As a result of the committee's work, NASA asked the ASEB to
reconstitute the ad hoc committee to address:
• onboard maintainability and repair,
• in-space research and technology program and facility plans,
• solar thermodynamic research and technology development program
planning,
• program performance (cost estimating, management, and cost
avoidance),
• onboard versus ground-based mission control, and
• technology development road maps from IOC to the growth station.
The objective of these new assignments is to provide NASA with advice
on ways and means for improving the content, performance, and/or
effectiveness of these elements of the space station program.
In response, the ASEB reconstituted the ad hoc committee. The
committee established panels to address each subject. The
participants of the panels come from the committee, industry, and
universities, providing each panel with individuals experienced in the
subject of special interest.
In view of NASA's interest in program definition and development, it
was decided that the subjects of maintainability, program performance,
and onboard mission control would be addressed in roundtable forums
focusing on concepts, system design, and organization.
It was decided that the subjects of research and technology in
space, solar thermodynamic research and technology development, and
technology development road maps would be addressed in workshops that
focus on NASA program activity and plans.
To expedite the documentation and dissemination of the information,
the deliberations of the panels are being reported as proceedings.
The proceedings of the Panel on Maintainability were published in May
1985 and those of the Panel on In-Space Engineering Research and
Technology Development, in August 1985. The proceedings of the Panel
on Solar Thermodynamics Research and Technology Development are under
final review. The proceedings of the Panel on Program Performance and
Onboard Mission Control are presented in this report. No date has
been set for the technology development road maps workshop.
THE PANEL ON PROGRAM PERFORMANCE AND
ONBOARD MISSION CONTROL
The task statement for the Panel on Program Performance and Onboard
Mission Control set forth that:
NASA will explain the background of the roundtable and
present an overview of the program, but not the program
approach [in any detail]. It is not intended for the panel to
critique the program. ... It is expected that a major
benefit of the round table will come from the real time
exchange of ideas among the panel and the NASA participants.
Possible discussion subjects for the meeting are:
• approaches to cost reduction and elimination through
engineering design, development, production, test and
evaluation, and operations
• management concepts for control of costs: design reviews,
change control, and cost tracking
• contracting techniques to encourage the achievement and
holding of low costs, schedules, and performance
• advantages and disadvantages of onboard versus ground-based
space station command and control
• appropriate split of roles for the initial operating
configuration and for the evolving (growth) station
• the relative roles of redundancy, automation, and remote
expert advice
• design and development philosophy and implications
Specific points of interest are:
• non-NASA techniques for system design and documentation
requirements and their potential cost impacts
possible reductions in NASA programmatic procedures
application of non-NASA standards
alternate approaches to program reviews
alternate approaches to configuration management
alternate approaches to verification tests
alternate approaches to cost estimating
suggestions for alternative deliverable data
The proceedings reported herein cover the panel's meeting at the
NASA Johnson Space Center on August 6-7, 1985. The meeting agenda is
presented in Appendix A. The list of panel members and participants
is presented on pages iii-iv.
The panel was briefed by NASA representatives; panel participants
discussed their views on program performance and mission command and
control; the panel engaged in general discussion; and then the panel
organized into three subpanels. Two subpanels addressed the cost
model and cost containment aspects of program performance; the third
addressed mission command and control. The observations of the
subpanels were reviewed with the full panel and NASA space station
program representatives.
This proceedings report presents the results of this process in two
parts. The first part deals with program performance, the second part
with mission control. A final section presents the panel's summary
observation^. Comments and observations are presented without
attribution.
Panel Deliberations
INTRODUCTION
The chairman, Joseph Shea, and the NASA liaison representative from
the Office of Space Station, Richard Carlisle, reviewed the background
and objectives of the meeting, including the past activity of the
ASEB's ad hoc Committee on Space Station Engineering and Technology
Development.
The panel took up its two subjects, program performance and mission
command and control, in separate roundtable discussions. Subpanels
were formed to comment on and develop their observations on each
subject. Mr. Carlisle's introductory comments and panel deliberations
on the two subjects of the meeting are presented in this chapter. The
following chapter summarizes the panel's observations.
Panel Objectives
Mr. Carlisle noted that through analyses, NASA has found a wide
disparity between cost estimates for unmanned and manned space system
hardware, software, and support. This disparity has caused concern
about the ability to project costs for a new system, such as the space
station. This concern has been amplified by wide differences in
industry cost estimates for similar hardware elements. Specific
comparisons of system manufacturer, Department of Defense, and NASA
costs for similar subsystems show difference ratios of 1 to 10. This
situation does not result in a comfortable feeling that the $8 billion
cost target for the initial operating configuration (IOC) space
station will be realized.
As reported later by David Bates (p. 10), early cost estimates for
the baseline program indicated costs higher than the $8 billion target.
Present IOC cost estimates indicate that holding to the $8 billion
cost target may not result in an acceptable program. Operations costs
(ground and space) are of equal concern. If cost estimates cannot be
relied on, it will be difficult to make meaningful trade-off analyses
and system selections.
NASA has these basic questions: Why do NASA manned space systems
cost more than unmanned space systems? Can costs be held down? Can
costs be controlled?
Mr. Carlisle noted that he hoped the panel would discuss these and
related matters openly to allow NASA representatives to gain from the
panel's experience. Thoughts on methods of cost estimating are of
special interest in view of the importance of cost estimates to program
definition. He viewed this kind of discussion as more productive than
a critique of what NASA is doing.
It is recognized that, ideally, cultural changes in the organiza-
tion and/or management techniques may be indicated. However, to be
realistic, the proposed changes have to be the type that can be
accommodated by the agency.
The charge to the panel is to concentrate on space station
engineering related to system analysis, design, operations, and
program performance; therefore, there is a need to give attention to
the differences between the projected space station program and
earlier NASA programs.
PROGRAM PERFORMANCE
Panel Discussion
It is recognized that the space station is different from other
manned space flight programs in that earlier missions (Mercury,
Gemini, Apollo, Skylab, and Shuttle) were more specifically defined
and did not have specific funding constraints. The space station
mission has a cost target (IOC, $8 billion), but the system is
relatively undefined. Under these circumstances, it is difficult to
estimate costs even if costs could be reasonably identified, which is
not the case.
The panel's comments related to cost modeling and confidence and
cost containment follow in the form of summary statements. These
summary statements are followed by a synopsis of NASA costing activity
and panel observations on program performance.
Cost Modeling and Confidence
With regard to cost modeling and confidence, basic questions were:
What type of cost modeling might be appropriate? How might confidence
in the estimates be improved? The panel's comments are summarized
here.
Top Level Directives It was suggested that top-level program
management, Level A, provide program guidance through a directive to
set firm, top-level program philosophy, constraints, and cost targets
and to instill design guides and cost consciousness in the program.
Establishing a Cost Base Definition of system capability and
performance (top down) is key to delineating production and operations
activities and to establishing a cost base. It may be necessary to
bring a team (including contractors) together for this purpose because
of the many interfaces and the need for good communications. The
contractors selected should understand the process and its importance
and have had experience with this type of estimating activity.
Cost Targets NASA needs to be explicit about IOC program costs. For
example, NASA should note specifically that the amount is $8 billion,
not $12 billion, or $10 billion, not $14 billion. There should be no
uncertainty. Firm selection of a cost constraint should be done early
to anchor the program. Leaving open the issues of program definition
and costs reduces management focus and motivation for cost control.
What is to be procured? What does the $8 billion covei—design,
development, IOC operations, NASA manpower?
Forcing Cost Analyses It is important to have cost targets to force
cost analyses. Existing technology should be used to define the base
system. Every subsystem cost beyond those of the base subsystems
should be treated as an increment of cost that can be reduced.
Reduction of Program Content The representative baseline program
costs assessed by NASA from in-house analyses are too high. An
approach to reducing cost is to reduce program content and not
necessarily to take an average cost reduction in all program segments.
Cost Estimate Improvement The program costs (contracted hardware and
support) that have been developed were not derived in a consistent
manner. NASA believes that the cost estimates will become more
believable as the preliminary design phase of the program, the second
part of Phase B, evolves.
Fitting Models to Hardware Good cost modeling is important if
high-cost items are to be identified and costs reduced. Historical
data can be used to build cost models, but the systems have to be
similar in performance and content and in design, development, and
testing if the cost models are to be relevant.
NASA Cost Estimating The panel needs a better understanding of NASA
cost-estimating activity. (See page 10.)
Use of Common/Standard Hardware The space station is a new type of
system for NASA because it will be designed for long life through
repairability and maintainability. NASA experience, including cost
estimating, does not include this class of hardware. For the space
station, NASA should reexamine the matter of common/standard hardware
(the same hardware used in more than one system) that it had once
pursued as an approach to reduce program costs .
Cost Containment
With regard to cost containment, the basic question is: How can
costs be contained or reduced once a program is defined and costs
estimated? The subpanel's comments are summarized in the following
paragraphs that deal with matters ranging from cost targets to
interface documentation to the use of NASA in-house staff, contractor
direction, and type of contracting.
Cost Targets Design-to-cost targets are needed early, down to at
least the major subsystem level. Development of these cost targets
will assist in cost trade analyses between design, development, test,
and operations considering both IOC and growth. These cost targets
need to communicated to all levels of the program. However, it should
be recognized that arbitrary cost constraints can adversely affect the
project through the curtailment or elimination of required work.
Responding to Payload Requirements System design requirements are
responsive to projected payload programs that have not and may not be
funded. Therefore, requirements and costs may be overstated. The
need to support overstated requirements may be conditioned by the
belief that such responsiveness is required to retain a constituency.
However, this, in part, may be the reason the science community is
reluctant to support fully the space station. They may be concerned
that costs will not be controlled and that large costs will have an
adverse impact on funds available for science.
Design Constraints If cost is to be a serious program driver, design
and development constraints must be mandated; one such constraint may
be use of existing technology. An issue explored was: Is the space
station program to be used to accelerate technology development or is
the space station to use existing technology? Design specifications
and cost considerations are affected by the selection of this
constraint. It is the panel's view that, in general, available
technology should be used to help hold costs and schedules.
Technology Development Both the use of technology not ready for
application and changes in technology adversely affect schedules and
costs. Early definition and development of critical technologies
minimizes these adverse effects. Selective support and application of
successful technology developments are important to enhancing space
station performance and controlling costs.
Program Structure It is important to structure the program so that it
can be reduced in size and/or scope through reduction and/or removal
of program elements while retaining an acceptable, viable program.
For example, incremental reductions in electric power generation for
IOC and increased subsystem specification flexibility to allow
adjustment of performance margins in response to system performance
adjustments and/or cost constraints should be considered.
Two-Stage Design It may be possible to treat the design of the space
station like that of a large commercial airplane. In the first time
8through, focus on the design process, with concentration on
design-to-function; in the second, concentrate on lowering costs.
Low Volume Production "Single"-item procurement causes high costs
because costs cannot be reduced through knowledge gained through
experience. There are ways around this: use of available and common
hardware; accurate statements of requirements; and holding specifica-
tions to needs. Stringent safety requirements will increase costs.
Safety and other design requirements should be reviewed for
appropriateness.
Manufacturing/Test Options A way to contain costs is to have design
teams explore more than one approach to manufacture and test and to
look hard at simplification of interfaces.
Repairable/Maintainable Design DOD and NASA missions have been
designed to provide essentially 100 percent operational capability
even when a component fails. There is no general need for a "100
percent operational" design philosophy for a repairable and
maintainable space station.
Interface Documentation and Control Good interface documentation and
control (to minimize errors and reduce costs) is required in view of
the number of contractors and NASA centers involved in the program.
It would be desirable to define and organize this activity early with
contractor input.
Computei—Aided Design and Manufacturing CAD-CAM can help control
interfaces through easy access to common specification, design, and
fabrication data bases. These techniques can also help assure a
consistent tie between systems and structures, allow concurrent design
and development activity, and assist in rapid, accurate change control.
Change Control A tight, quick change-control process can reduce
costs. Although fast action is desirable, care should be taken in the
system to avoid adverse change impacts and redundant change actions.
Early setting of design specifications and change-control ground rules
will help minimize rework and costs. Once specifications are set,
they should be followed, with change implemented only due to a
significant reason.
Out-of-Specification Flexibility Systems engineering decisions must
be flexible enough to accommodate what is "out-of-specification but
acceptable" to avoid rework costs.
Test Procedures To help minimize cost, articles should be obtained
and tested early. Test requirements should not be imposed without a
real need. Instead of repeating tests at higher levels of build-up,
test and operational procedures should be established that build up
and build on test activity, thereby minimizing inspection and
check-out. It is better not to test to destruction. The same and/or
similar evaluation equipment should be used through ground and flight
operation.
Design and development changes can be expected in the "one-of-a-
kind" space station program. Development test procedures can reduce
equipment needs, changes, and adjustments. Consideration should be
given to procedures such as subcritical testing and burn-in operation
of equipment versus destructive testing, as well as to the use of
built-in testing versus special test equipment.
Manned System Testing A review of acceptance testing (some one-third
of manned system program costs) appears appropriate. NASA's manned
systems have required greater levels of testing than have unmanned
NASA and DOD systems.
Services and Support Space station costs appear to be 20 percent for
hardware and 80 percent for other services and support. Unmanned
spacecraft systems have an 80 percent/20 percent split. The "80
percent" space station activity needs to be examined for validity.
Standard/Common Parts High reliability and lower costs are enhanced
through actions that provide parts control, standardization, and
commonality.
Standards and Procedures Some standards, procedures, and operations
(e.g., soldering specifications) may not represent the best
state-of-the-art and can cause costs to rise. Standards and
procedures should be reviewed for currency and applicability.
Ground and Space Control A hard, early look should be undertaken at
on-ground support to hold down costs. It is recognized that the
on-orbit control and management system will evolve through the period
of build-up to IOC operation. In this period, it is anticipated that
ground-based support will decrease and onboard mission command and
control will become more self contained. It is also anticipated that
the ground-support staffing will be reduced in time through automation
of routine activity and special functions such as fault detection,
isolation, and repair identification. These transitions need to be
planned, recognizing that they will be based, to a degree, on
operational experience.
Use of Crew Crew time in space, a valuable commodity, should be
conserved. The crew should be used for mission work to the degree
possible. The IOC should remain simple, and major diagnostics and
planning for station rework, etc. should be done on the ground. It
should be less costly to do mission control support work on the
ground. An approach to maximizing crew time for payload work would be
to restrict the crew to work required to keep the system operationally
safe and useful between shuttle service (90-day) flights.
Use of In-house Staff NASA in-house staff could be used for in-line
program support, as part of the design team, e.g., as the hardware and
software test, acceptance, and/or integration team. This would put
NASA in a strong technical position with respect to knowing the
systems and would assist in reducing the contractor work force as the
program matures.
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Management Overview Non-hardware program costs can be high due to
management overview and review. Compared to nongovernment civil
programs, government management costs are two to three times as great,
possibly greater. An analysis is needed of the kind, number, and
content of reviews with action directed at reducing them.
Responsibilities of Managers In support of fast, knowledgeable
decision making, NASA subsystem managers should be responsible for the
technical, schedule, and cost aspects of their programs. These
functions shoulcl not be separated as appears to be the general case.
Funding Stability Funding instability will cause cost escalation. An
attempt should be made to eliminate unplanned fluctuations in actual
budgets although such fluctuations are difficult to control.
Contractor Direction It is important that NASA avoid telling people
(contractors) "how-to-do." NASA should direct attention to
"what-to-do" and allow contractors more freedom to pursue high
performance at low cost.
Type of Contracting Several factors may create high costs: the type
of contracting selected (unnecessarily restrictive and no incentives),
the differences between planned and actual work, and planned and
actual deliverables. System specifications need to be pragmatic and
cost targets set to provide a framework for controlling and trading
cost and product.
NASA Costing Activity
Following the roundtable discussion, David Bates of the NASA
Johnson Space Center (JSC) Space Station Program Management Office,
management Level B, presented a brief overview of the cost-estimating
methodology used by Level B. The graphics he used are presented in
Appendix B. After panel discussion of this overview, Allen Louviere
of JSC commented on Level B's costing responsibilities.
Cost Estimating Methodology—David Bates, JSC
(Briefing Graphics—Appendix B)
Both prime and non-prime contract cost elements are used to develop
the total space station program cost estimates. The major program
hardware elements (station, platforms, attached payload accommodations,
and other costs called wrap—those costs not associated with the
hardware but with program support activity) make up the prime costs.
The non-prime costs include fee, reserve, and program definition
activity.
It is estimated that of the 100 percent prime development costs,
60 percent pays for hardware and 40 percent pays for wraps. Non-prime
program costs are estimated to be about 35 percent of the program's
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development costs and include program reserves. NASA's manpower and
related overhead costs are not included in the prime and non-prime
costs.
Early cost estimates for the baseline program revealed costs higher
than the $8 billion target. Present IOC cost estimates indicate that
holding to the $8 billion cost target may not result in an acceptable
program.
The early cost estimates for the reference space station configura-
tion were refined through reexamination of assumptions, upgrading of
cost models, use of contractor estimates, and inclusion of program
elements originally overlooked. The soundness of the estimates are in
question due to several factors: the broad variation in estimates
from different sources for similar program elements; the difference in
cost-estimating procedures and models used by the different work
package teams; the use of weight and complexity factors as a simple
way to modify existing models; a mix of data from manned and unmanned
systems; and assumptions related to cost savings associated with the
application of protoflighting and commonality. In addition, wraps and
other cost factors are best guesses because of the open state of
program definition.
Level B recognizes that the development of good cost estimates is
hampered by additional factors: the number of system elements,
interface uncertainties, lack of test and development plans, failure
of the cost models to be truly applicable, and strategic over- or
undei—costing. Level B also recognizes that system weight is not a
good cost function for many of the systems being costed even with the
application of correction factors to adjust the models for complexity.
Comments and observations made during the overview briefing are
noted here.
• NASA space station staffing (some 2,000 people) is significant,
approaching a cost of $840 million for the 7 years leading to IOC.
• Hardware versus support costs are targeted for 65/35, exclusive of
NASA in-house manpower and overhead costs.
• To help hold costs to the $8 billion target, it is assumed that the
orbital maneuvering unit (OMU) will be funded by the Shuttle
program and procurred from that program by the space station
program.
• Support costs for foreign systems have not been factored into the
cost estimates.
• Level B is pursuing the development of independent cost estimates
to provide a basis for evaluating contractor estimates.
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• NASA's manned and unmanned system cost models have different cost
trends with increasing weight, with the manned systems costing more
per pound. The cause (or causes) of the differences is being
examined, keeping in mind that parameters other than weight have to
be considered.
• As a rule it is necessary to find systems as close as possible to
the ones being costed and scale them if reasonable estimates are to
be attained. Most of the models illustrated appear to be too far
removed from the new systems being considered. Some systems are
not necessarily weight related in the classical sense, i.e.,
software, electronic controls, and data systems.
• The Shuttle itself imposes costs due to packing and performance
limits for both IOC and operations support. To reduce logistic
costs, NASA should examine, if it is not already doing so, the
ability to improve Shuttle load factors and performance.
• The ground control center will not be an initial area for reduced
operations and, therefore, cost savings. But, in the longer term,
it should be possible to simplify and reduce those operations and
costs.
Costing Responsibilities—Allen Louviere, JSC
Allen Louviere, of the JSC Systems Engineering and Integration
Office, discussed the office's program cost-estimating responsi-
bilities. The office is sensitive to the problems of fully
representing and costing the space station program and is covering
matters other than major hardware: maintainability and redundancy,
commonality and spares, growth and scaring (preparing for additions).
Some cost matters have not been addressed adequately: on-orbit
assembly; spare part requirements; launches (estimated at 12 to 15 for
IOC); verification, fault detection, and checkout; interface and
customer support requirements; and payload servicing. It is recognized
that improvement in space transportation capability needs attention;
it can beneficially affect design and support costs.
The office fully intends to address IOC versus operational versus
growth costs to optimize life-cycle costs. The office is sensitive to
the need to examine other cost models (military and NASA in-house) to
improve the models used for space station costing and plans to examine
military and in-house hardware and manufacturing specifications to
simplify, standardize, reduce, and contain costs.
Panel Observations on Program Performance
The panel organized into two subpanels (Appendix C) to address the
broad subject of program performance. One subpanel addressed cost
modeling and confidence and the other cost containment. The subpanels
made the following observations.
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Cost Modeling and Confidence Subpanel
In general, the subpanel concluded that the present cost models,
based almost exclusively on weight, are not acceptable. To make them
useful for estimating costs will require considerable work and a
careful look at and an understanding of the factors that affect
costs. Weight is not a good single parameter for extrapolating
costs. It is probable that no single factor will suffice. In the
process of estimating costs a corollary action should be taken—
exploring ways to reduce costs.
One reason NASA is not in a position to fix dollar targets for
program elements is that program guidance has been so general. To
help implement design-to-cost, the program should be explicitly
defined before the second part of Phase B (preliminary design) gets
under way.
Specific subpanel observations follow on cost modeling related to
flaws, improvements, utility, and next steps.
Cost Model Flaws
• Present modeling, like most, has many flaws. It lacks consistency
in assumptions, data bases, and application. The hardware systems
used to structure the models do not always reflect the character of
the systems under study.
• The selection of weight as the principal variable is often an
oversimplification and not the correct variable.
• The wraps are not complete and are arrived at by rule-of-thumb, not
on the basis of program content.
• Model limitations are not stated or understood regarding
applicability, range of uncertainty, or level of credibility.
• Estimates of operating or life-cycle costs do not appear to have
been made.
Model Improvement
• Detailed analyses or educated best guesses should be provided by
experienced design and development groups where applicable data are
not available to upgrade the space station cost models.
• The work breakdown structure should be set down and used as the
framework for cost build-up. A range of costs should be provided
for activities that are uncertain or not fully definable.
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• U.S. Air Force models should be exercised but comparability with
projected space station systems should be assured. Differences
between manned and unmanned systems must be understood and
characterized.
• Important parameters, other than weight, need to be examined and
applied appropriately to adjust cost models.
• Models should be tested for reasonableness of cost estimates. In
most instances this does not appear to have been done.
• A more in-depth base for establishing wrap costs needs to be
developed and a costing philosophy identified. This action is also
needed for operations and life-cycle costs.
• Whatever the cost-estimating system, its limitations and their
implications to allow assessment of credibility need to be
understood.
Current Model Utility
• The present models could be used for gross estimation of the order
of cost for the baseline system, grossly scoping the "$8 billion
program" and grossly identifying large cost drivers. However, the
models are too gross to use to descope a baseline system and/or to
set subsystem cost targets.
Next Steps
• Effort should be directed to making the best cost estimates and not
to developing the best cost-estimating technique.
• Cost assessments need to be built up from top-down statements of
work using bottoms-up estimating.
• Such data should be used to refine in-house cost estimates. For
comparison, other groups experienced in costing should make base
program cost assessments.
• To reduce uncertainties, it is necessary to refine and calibrate
the estimating system continuously.
• Cost targets need to be developed for program elements based on the
steps noted above.
• Cost drivers at the subsystem level, subsystem by subsystem, need
to be identified.
In summary, the subpanel believes that the present effort is
directed at improvement of modeling and that it would be more prudent
to direct effort and attention to making the best estimates and not to
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developing the best methodology. It is believed that a good model for
a unique system requires engineering attention, i.e., bottoms-up
structuring from specifications to production to test and operations.
The capability of assessing costs with reasonable confidence is needed
at the time major configuration trades are made. Cost is a key and,
to a degree, controlling parameter.
Cost Containment Subpanel
The cost containment subpanel was concerned that the space station
program was not more explicitly defined in terms of performance and
costs to provide a firm framework for the concept development part of
the Phase B contracted activity and, more particularly, for the
preliminary design part of Phase B. Another point of concern was the
lack of clear, direct lines of management responsibility from program
management levels C directly to B directly to A. A simple line of
allegiance and command is needed to allow rapid and direct
communication, decision making, and direction. This management
scheme, in principle, is illustrated in Figure 1.
The subpanel's cost containment broad and specific observations,
not prioritized, are listed here.
Broad Comments
Program Strategy NASA should establish and communicate a firm
philosophical position on program strategy given the $8 billion (or
another specific target) budget. Is the program strategy one of
technology push—advanced technology carried in the space station—or
technology pull—advanced technology applied to the station? In the
first case, the station is a ready means, using state-of-the-art
technology, for working in space. In the latter case, the space
station, itself, drives and uses advanced technology to provide the
ability to work in space and can be expected to result in a more
costly program in the near term.
Available Hardware NASA should use off-the-shelf available
hardware if, as is assumed, costs are a real program constraint for
the baseline space station. There should be a "no" to almost all
technology alternatives, even "low-risk," for IOC. Exceptions to the
"no" would have clear high benefits in the near term as well as the
longer term.
Designed-in Payload Support In the interest of lower costs and
flexibility, a harder position should be taken on limiting designed-in
payload support capability. The space station should accommodate a
broad spectrum of user requirements, especially for IOC, but should
not be tailored to specific needs through built-in capability.
Growth and Operations The program office should select a
configuration that constrains IOC costs (within the selected budget)
but will accommodate growth, fully considering growth and operational
16
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costs. Configuration and cost decisions cannot be made without
accounting for all of these cost factors.
Cost a Constraint NASA should fix program design, cost, and
strategy with costs as a real constraint; in addition, they should
identify the concept and its capabilities to the user and funding
communities. A constrained program could cause adverse user reaction,
but a position needs to be taken to preserve long-term program
integrity and support. High early program costs and/or schedule
stretches may have a greater adverse impact on the program in the long
term than a constrained IOC program. Administration and Congressional
support could be reduced and/or withdrawn.
Program Guidance Definitive program guidance should be communicated
to all active program participants. This is important whatever the
final disposition of the matters addressed in the preceding paragraphs.
Single Chain of Command It is important that NASA minimize and
focus organizational interfaces and responsibility through a single
programmatic chain of command with top-down budget, technical,
schedule, and performance management and control (Figure 1). Further,
the project office (Level B) should obtain fixed-price and technical
performance and schedule commitments from Level C. Level A must be
the czar of the Level B and Level C effort.
Specific Comments
Wraps Review wraps for content and overlap. It is not clear that
all major elements are accounted for or that some elements are not
covered more than once between "prime" and "non-prime."
Expendables Reduce expendables to hold resupply requirements down.
Judicious use of advanced technology will help.
Management Assignments Assign dollar targets for program elements
down to the lowest possible levels of management. Assign to lower and
upper levels of management integrated performance, schedule, and cost
responsibilities.
Data Base Establish a common data base for the total program
covering both technical and management matters. Communicate the data
base to all program levels.
Minimize Documentation Tailor all documentation and oversight
activity—specifications, practices, and reviews—to impose minimum
requirements. This will require concerted, dedicated effort.
Change Control Define and establish change control procedures
early. Make the system effective and its response fast. Define
interfaces and performance boundaries as broadly as possible to
minimize the need for change. This process (except for major changes
that impact basic program performance, schedule and/or factors that
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require Level A review and approval) should be overviewed and managed
by the Level B systems engineering and integration group.
Use of NASA Personnel Use NASA personnel for in-line program
activity; do more, watch less. For example, NASA personnel could work
interface control, check-out, and test. This hands-on activity would
keep NASA actively informed and integrated into the engineering
development, assist in reducing contractor staff loads toward the end
of development and test activity, and reduce program costs.
Commonality Reduce new work and duplication of activity through
use of common parts and components. Use common specifications and
make quantity buys, carefully monitoring production lines for
performance and quality of articles produced.
Shuttle Optimization Optimize the performance and the loads for
the Shuttle for space station application. This is a significant cost
item for IOC, follow-on operations, and growth.
Engineering and Costs Involve engineering in the estimation and
reduction of costs through early definition of design, development,
and test activity; design to hold down costs; and analyses to help set
cost targets and control and reduce costs.
MISSION COMMAND AND CONTROL
The Level B approach to mission command and control, ground and
space-born, was reviewed for the panel by Richard Thorson of the JSC
Space Station Office. The graphics used for his discussion are
presented in Appendix D. A summary of his comments and related panel
observations follow.
Overview—Richard Thorson, JSC
(Briefing Graphics—Appendix D)
The people in mission control, often referred to as the "marching
army," equate to a large cost item. A number of concepts for reduced
ground-based support are being examined. No single approach has been
selected. Of special concern is the user interface with space station
mission control.
The level and depth of support required for mission command and
control are being examined by the involved centers: JSC, station
support; Goddard Space Flight Center, platform support; and Kennedy
Space Center, logistics and prelaunch support.
The space station information system is projected to be a
distributed system that will integrate required data at a command
level. The system will serve all elements: ground support, station,
platforms, and users. Information and system management interfaces
are critical design areas.
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The split of command and control functions between the ground and
the space station is still to be resolved. Consideration is being
given to allowing payload managers direct remote payload control and
data retrieval. This requires careful consideration of such matters
as space station operations, control, servicing, and safety. There
are serious questions about the degree of freedom-of-access that users
can have on a system of the nature of the space station.
With regard to platforms, there is no plan to allow direct access
to data by payload managers. However, this is being examined. At
present, the plan is to have all data transmitted through the space
communications network to a central station on the ground.
Mission control will be treated in phases because requirements will
change with space station build-up and with operational experience.
But, interfaces need to be addressed and designed into the system to
accommodate growth.
It is reasonably clear that mission planning and control will have
to be handled on a daily as well as a long-term basis. The daily
planning of operations may well be, in all probability will be, an
onboard function.
Mission control studies include guidelines calling for low hardware
development and operating costs. The contractors are to consider
economic trades, use of existing facilities and equipment, and onboard
autonomy. Identification and examination of needed ground support
functions are in process. It is be assumed that there will be a number
of years of verification activity after IOC, that ground operations
will move from verification to a reduced operations support mode, and
that on-board command and control activity will grow.
Of particular concern is maintenance and operation of the space
station itself and its payloads. Studies have not progressed to where
decisions can be made on the appropriate split of command and control
between the ground and the station. One area under study is onboard
user payload verification.
It is probable, in the longer term, that the space station will
have control over local traffic. The matters of launch, recovery, and
platform movement can be expected to be the responsibility of ground
control. It is also probable that maintenance and logistics planning
and support will be a ground function iterated with the station
command.
Spares and maintenance will be significant cost items. Some of
these costs, even for IOC, are considered outside the original
$8 billion target program. Such IOC requirements will have to be
factored into the program early. Providing spares later will be
expensive in time and money. However, no clear identification of
needs or costs have been made.
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Because of the distributed nature of hardware responsibilities,
including foreign participation, a centralized control of interfaces
will be needed. Appropriate interlocks and/or interfaces will be
required as will a unified system of command for mission planning and
operations both daily and longer term. A bridge-type operation, as on
a ship, is indicated. The bridge could be on the ground but more
likely, especially for daily operations, it will be on the space
station.
Mission command and control are possibly the most complex tasks of
the whole space station effort. The tasks are receiving serious,
in-depth attention by program management.
Mission command and control costs, both development and recurring,
are under study. The costs associated with user activity are
considered outside of the $8 billion program and are expected to be
funded by the users. The Jet Propulsion Laboratory is working to
develop a model of user recurring activity. One concern is that
near-term activity and costs will be pushed downstream to reduce early
budget requirements. Such action could cause the neai—term program to
be underfunded and adversely affect out-year budgets, causing later
problems.
Some issues important to the definition of mission command and
control need to be resolved soon. One issue relates to the
responsibility for the design and development of support and servicing
equipment for payloads, including data handling. At present, it is
assumed that such special needs will be the responsibility of the
user, but what of general support, servicing requirements, and data
handling on board and data transmission to the ground?
The space data transmission system, operating in the K-band, will
handle 300 megabits of information. This capability will dictate the
need for rapid data processing at the ground receiver site.
Subpanel on Mission Command and Control
After discussion, the subpanel (Appendix C) developed the following
findings related to on-ground and in-space mission command and control.
Level of Attention The command and control responsibilities appear to
be given appropriate, serious attention including balancing on-ground
and in-space responsibilities and functions for station assembly,
check-out, and growth.
Commonality Special attention must be given to connectors if as is
indicated space station operations will be monitored by the crew and
will be based on on-condition maintenance at the subsystem (card)
rather than element level. This includes consideration of commonality
and functional check-out to minimize kinds and numbers of parts and
costs.
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Crew Performance The crew's health should be monitored and attended
to by a doctor on the station rather than through the use of monitoring
devices worn by crew members and remote counsel. This will provide
the best possible immediate care (with appropriate ground consultation
if required) and help assure high levels of crew performance.
Commander's Role The commander must have ultimate authority over space
station control and safety functions. He must also have intervention
capability over all space station operational activities. This means
that all critical operational data must be available to him and that
he has the equivalent of a ship's bridge and associated responsibility
and authority. There must be no ambiguity and clear lines of authority
in management of the space station to assure safety of crew and
preservation of the space station and its payloads , probably in this
order of priority.
Traffic Control Operations in the space station and in the general
vicinity of the station (about 20 miles) should be under the control
of the station. Transport operations otherwise should be controlled
from the ground. Although general command and control would be from
the ground the crew on the station would be in the best position to
judge and react to station and nearby traffic situations requiring
prompt action.
Mission Planning Central planning and general scheduling of
day-to-day functions should be managed from the ground. This would
include general operations and routine housekeeping. It should be
less expensive of space station crew and time to do routine planning
and support work on the ground.
Operations Planning Operations is a difficult activity; for unmanned
systems it generally represents about one-third of the program costs.
The operations definition and development effort requires a manager
responsible for, among other matters, the control center, protocols,
space system control, communications, and data processing. It does
not appear that Level B is staffed appropriately to handle the degree
of design and development activity required. Consideration should be
given to bringing a NASA center or a contractor into the activity to
provide appropriate levels of technical and management support.
Operations Requirements Operational system planning should start with
the development of a requirements baseline. The baseline should define
such things as data rates and buffering as opposed to planning for
broad mechanization. Emphasis on requirements and concepts appears to
be missing. Building the system up from a more restrictive require-
ments basis versus a broad mechanization basis should be less costly
and quicker.
User Operational Access User data streams appear to be complex. In
view of the 300-megabit data handling capability, a data processing
center attached to the ground station will be required. Is there a
real need/requirement for real time interaction between distributed
users and onboard payloads? If this is the case, the way this would
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be accomplished was not evident. Because of safety and operational
condition-matching requirements, it may not be reasonable to allow the
user free access to experiments. This obviously will require
case-by-case examination.
Data Archiving Archiving user data has been a significant problem.
It can be expected to be a substantial growing issue for the space
station program. The users should be responsible for archiving their
own data. If space station operations and safety information is part
of the data flow, consideration should be given to stripping and
independently handling these data.
Automation The level and degree of automation will vary with time. A
plan that defines the changing system and its implementation should be
in development. The Shuttle could be used to develop automation
capability. Automation is a large issue in itself. It should be
applied where truly effective in reducing routine and/or performing
difficult tasks for the crew. Criteria should be formulated to help
direct the space station automation development.
Assembly Planning Assembly of the space station may be the most
dangerous phase of the program. It will involve extra vehicular
activity and control of individual and partially assembled elements of
the station with the Shuttle present. A comprehensive assembly and
check out plan is required for this activity.
The subpanel considered the listing of selected technology issues
and implications shown in Table 1. The technical issues listed
represent desirable space station features and to a degree are being
addressed. Achievement of these features will require careful
attention to matters such as fault-tolerant and standard network
architecture, high-reliability parts, and standard hardware and
software modules. Another important consideration will be built-in
test capability at the major component and at the built-up system
levels to simplify both ground and flight validation of function and
to validate repair and maintenance work done in space.
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TABLE 1 Critical Technology Issues: Space Station
Command and Control
Issue Implication
Natural space environment
Long mission life
Test
Reliability
Performance
(initial and growth)
Growth and technology upgrade
Low risk and cost
Autonomy
Fault-tolerant architecture
Radiation hardened components
Fault-tolerant architecture
High reliability parts
Good built-in-test
Good built-in-test capability
Testability designed-in, not added
Use of good design tools
(Engineering CAD)
Fault-tolerant architecture
High reliability parts
Modular distributed architecture
Dedicated special function modules
(e.g., image processing)
Fiber optic internal communication
network
Standard network architecture
(interface and protocols)
Modular distributed architecture
Standard network architecture
(interface and protocols)
Standard hardware and software
modules
Standard network architecture
(interface and protocols)
Standard high order language
Application generators used for
software module development
Use of good design tools
(Engineering CAD)
Modular distributed architecture
Fault-tolerant architecture
Summary Observations
INTRODUCTION
The panel on program performance and mission command and control
believes that NASA is fully aware of the kinds of matters that need to
be addressed to assess and control costs associated with space station
design and development and mission command and control.
The panel believes that there are some program performance and
mission command and control matters that with further attention could
improve the success of the space station program. Selected topics
discussed in the text of these proceedings, as they relate to program
performance and mission command and control, are summarized in the
following paragraphs.
PROGRAM PERFORMANCE
Management Directives
The matter of program performance focuses on program costs. The
fact that NASA has chosen not to fix the IOC costs of the space
station keeps the in-house and contracted activity relatively
unfocused for too long a period of time. The panel believes that a
Level A directive fixing program philosophy, providing design
guidance, and setting cost targets would be very helpful in quickly
driving activity toward practical performance and design choices and
containing costs.
The freezing of mission performance capability to what can be done
practically within budget and technical constraints is important. The
users will be able to focus on what is possible and will adapt to
realistic program constraints. Present planning is attempting to
accommodate uncertain payload requirements from scientific and
technical as well as funding considerations. Thus, there is slow
closure on design specifics and cost estimates.
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Technology Application
In the opinion of the panel, the program should use available
technology to hold down costs. The program should be technically
conservative unless associated performance and/or operational
constraints are unacceptable. It is believed to be more important
that the station serve as a facility to broaden our knowledge and use
of space than to have the station itself serve as a driver of
technology development.
Design and Performance Margins
In the area of systems engineering, costs can be reduced with
attention to the following kinds of matters through provision for:
broad design and system performance margins; adjustments to design and
performance specifications during acceptance testing; tight interface
control; and increased levels of redundancy. The adequacy of NASA
in-house staff and the mix between in-house and contractor personnel
should be reviewed. It may be necessary to increase support through
the use of NASA center or contractor personnel.
Use of CAD and CAM
NASA is exploring the use of computer-aided design (CAD) and
computer-aided manufacturing (CAM) not only to assist in design and
manufacture, but also to establish a common data base among program
elements and for interface control. This perspective is strongly
endorsed by the panel. Special attention through these mechanisms
should be given to establishing and controlling standard parts,
systems, and modules for the program.
Management Culture
Past management practices are not necessarily appropriate for the
space station program if performance, schedules, and costs are to be
contained. Management changes may well require "cultural" changes
within NASA.
These are some examples of change that should be considered:
reducing reviews and reporting and related levels of documentation for
design and fabrication; using screening tests to get high reliability
parts; building spares concurrent with first articles; making only
block changes; integrating testing and testing only to qualify not
through destruction; using test articles for flight and/or spares;
reducing the number of redundant checks; providing a system of rapid
change control with short information loops; making articles work, not
changing them for incremental improvement; using built-in tests as
part of prelaunch checkout; using in-house staff for selected in-line
design/development (possibly interface test and control) as a means of
keeping staff technically in-the-program and helping to reduce
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contractor support requirements; standardizing, simplifying, and
tailoring specifications for consistency among center activities; and
providing less "how-to-do" and more "what-to-do" directives to
contractors.
NASA's system and subsystem managers should be made responsible for
technical performance, schedules, and costs. This approach forces
complete awareness of and responsibility for program needs,
constraints, and performance.
Design-to-Cost
The approach to design-to-cost requires system definition and cost
targets. It appears that this matter is not being pursued adequately.
Life-cycle cost considerations are not evident. These costs need to
be examined to allow sensible choices between IOC and growth. There
is a need to be willing to trade system performance and schedules for
cost.
To help contain program costs, it is important to enter preliminary
design with a cost model and target costs. It is also important to
enter into final design with cost margins so that trades and scope
changes can be made.
Cost Modeling
Current cost estimating is not sufficiently refined to inspire or
create confidence in the estimates. One concern is to understand the
large differences between costs of manned and unmanned space flight
systems. Although it may be of long-term value to improve the model,
the desired improvements may not be adequate or come in time to be
useful. It is believed that the effort might be best spent developing
cost estimates from an engineering analysis of work to be done and
time required plus procurement of hardware and equipment and supporting
cost estimates. This bottoms-up approach would provide a sound base
for follow-on space station cost modeling.
Contractor Sensitivity
An integral part of the process of cost awareness is contractor
attitude, approach, and performance. The contractors need to have a
strong incentive to deliver on schedule, within cost, and to
performance and technical specifications. The contractors also need
to know that there are penalties if commitments are not met. These
matters need to be addressed in NASA's contracts.
27
MISSION COMMAND AND CONTROL
Onboard Control
The degree of onboard command and control should be dictated by
best use of crew from crew safety and space station and payload system
operational considerations. It is clear to the panel that the space
station must have a commander operating from a "bridge," in the sense
of a bridge on a ship, with ultimate authority for control and safety
of the crew, station, and payloads.
The station should have control of activity in its vicinity, such
as the Shuttle, and other transport vehicle approaches, dockings, and
departures. Other activity should be ground controlled.
Ground Control
It appears reasonable to assume that most routine mission management
work can be accomplished on the ground, leaving the crew to concentrate
on the demanding on-site tasks.
Planning
The levels of planning for assembly and automation need to be
increased. Assembly may well be the most exacting and dangerous part
of the program. A comprehensive assembly and check-out plan is
warranted to assure a thorough review and assessment of options and
the final choice of plan and its implementation. Automation can be
expected to evolve with specific needs and experience. However,
definitive planning for the kinds and level of IOC automated activity
is needed. Growth planning at present will in all probability be
limited to general accommodations and interfaces.
Urgency
Because most of the matters addressed here affect the second part
of the contracted Phase B effort (preliminary design), there is some
urgency in developing a position on each. The more explicit the
better.
Explicit direction for preliminary design will help focus the
Phase B technical peforraance, design, schedule, and cost effort for
Phases C and D guidance.
28
Staffing
The level of NASA staffing for the mission command and control
function does not appear to be adequate for the importance and size of
the task. Contractor or NASA center help to provide the level of
technical and management support appropriate to the subject is
indicated.
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APPENDIX A
Meeting Agenda
SPACE STATION ENGINEERING AND TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT
Panel on Program Performance and Onboard Mission Control
AGENDA
August 6-7, 1985
NASA Johnson Space Center
Houston, Texas
Tuesday, August 6
Introduction J. Shea, Chairman
NASA Comments R. Carlisle, NASA HQ
—Concerns, Questions, Issues
Related Comments Panel
General Discussion Panel
Organization of Subpanels J. Shea
Program Performance TBD
Onboard Mission Control K. Holtby
Individual Subpanel Meetings Subpanels
Discussion
Drafting of Position Statements
Wednesday, August 7
Individual Subpanel Meetings (cont.) Subpanels
Discussion
Drafting of Position Statements
Review of Statements Panel
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